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INTRODUCTION 
When we see an object, a laptop sitting on a library desk, or a parcel of 
land, we have no difficulty recognizing that someone probably owns it. Most 
people in our society (save, perhaps, for legal scholars and thieves) instinc-
tively perceive tangible objects as property and appreciate the concomitant 
responsibilities imposed on owners and the public. In other words, trespasser-
George knows best not to take the computer from the desk, or to walk onto 
fenced-off land without permission—the duties (or obligations) that property 
imposes on him. Owner-Mary knows that she is entitled to do with her land 
as she pleases (within reasonable limitations set by the State)—her privileges 
as a property holder.1 Mary also knows that she has unique recourses against 
George, were George to interfere with her property—her rights as an owner. 
Thus, property serves as a signaling device that informs the holder and 
all others how to interact with the thing, and what they may or may not do 
with it. Property scholars consider this signaling function to be a crucial 
element of property.2 Indeed, recognizing a thing as property could disturb 
 
1 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and 
Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 602-05 (2008) [hereinafter Balganesh, 
Demystifying] (discussing the “right-privilege distinction”). 
2 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81-82 
(1985) (“[C]lear titles facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting conf[l]ict.”). 
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the signaling function embedded in a given object, thereby forcing individuals 
to recalibrate their understanding of the rights and obligations that attach to 
it3: George and Mary would no longer know how to interact with the thing.4 
Similarly, when courts equivocate on their recognition of a given thing as 
property, they compromise the efficacy of property’s signaling function. The 
operation of property as an effective means of signaling obligations and 
privileges depends on our ability to identify a thing as property and the 
consistency of the categorization system that we employ.  
While it is easy for us to recognize a tangible object as property,5 we are 
less comfortable recognizing an intangible thing, such as trade secrets, news, 
advanced degrees, or our time, as property. The same goes for objects that, 
though tangible, lie too close to the boundaries of ethics and bodily autonomy 
when identified as property. We find it unconscionable to think of organs, 
limbs, sperm,6 DNA, or bone marrow as property, for instance.7 We also 
experience discomfort when asked to determine whether what I call “semi-
tangibles” enjoy property-law protection. These semitangibles might 
include an email server or information traveling between computers and 
Internet service providers. 
Because of these ambiguities, I propose an analytical tool (which I call 
the “property matrix”) to aid scholars, legislators, and lawyers in tackling 
the question, “Is this property?” I argue that we can create guidelines to 
answer this question even before we have academic consensus on a compre-
hensive definition of property, so that we may respond to pressing concerns 
about whether a given thing should be so labeled. Instead of defining what 
property is, my aim with the property matrix is more impressionistic; it is, 
 
3 I would like to thank my editor, Ethan Simonowitz, for this language. In his words: “Were 
we to take a given object—an object that currently enjoys a degree of consensus in the community 
regarding whether or not it constitutes property—and change its ‘property-ness,’ then individuals 
would be faced with the challenge of recalibrating the rights and obligations that attend to that 
thing.”  
4 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 47 (2000) (“The one out of one hundred who 
adopts a nonstandard form for property rights can increase the costs of processing the rights of 
ninety-nine others.”). 
5 Some scholars posit that property rights are so instinctive that nonhuman species, like 
wolves and chimpanzees, recognize them. See generally Melvin C. Fredlund, Wolves, Chimps and 
Demsetz, 14 ECON. INQUIRY 279 (1976). 
6 See infra note 243. 
7 Cf. J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 804 (1996) 
(“What makes it impossible to conceive of certain rights as property rights, such as the right not to 
be murdered or the right to assemble or the right to marry or the right to make binding agree-
ments, is that one cannot conceive of how such rights could be separated from a person . . . .”). 
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to borrow a concept from Justice Stewart, an “I know it when I see it” 
understanding of property.8  
In Part I, I provide an overview of our current understanding of 
property. I then describe a two-part test—the property matrix—to determine 
whether a given thing should be considered property. In Part II, I identify 
six contexts in which courts have struggled with defining and applying 
principles of property. I then compare these six “case studies” against the 
property matrix. In my conclusion, I posit that there may be varying degrees 
of property rights—weak, medium, and strong—and I suggest that each level 
gives rise to different groupings of obligations and privileges. 
I. THE PROPERTY MATRIX 
There are three circumstances under which the question, “Is this thing 
property?” might arise in court: under the takings doctrine,9 when property 
is a required element in a statutory cause of action,10 and when a court is 
reviewing the remedies that an alleged property holder has at his disposal 
against an intrusion or interference.11 In these circumstances, courts ulti-
mately seem to be asking the same question: Should we label this (be it 
bone marrow, an attorney’s time, trade secrets, etc.) property? Though not 
uncontroversial, once we decide whether the analyzed thing is property, 
certain consequences follow naturally.12 A court’s answer to the seemingly 
simple question of whether a given thing constitutes property is crucial. In 
any of these three circumstances—when dealing with “new” or ambiguous 
forms of property—this question will be the most litigated issue.  
Given the prominence of property in our legal system, it is surprising 
that there is no universally accepted definition of the concept.13 Nevertheless, 
scholars do agree that property has certain characteristics. Most theorists 
concede that the institution of property describes the rights that a person 
 
8 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
9 See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1153, 1160-62 (Okla. 1990) (holding that forcing an 
attorney into representing indigent defendants may result in a violation of the Takings Clause). 
10 See infra Section II.A (mail and wire fraud). 
11 See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 303-04 (Cal. 2003) (reviewing possible remedies 
for interference with a company’s email server by a disgruntled former employee); Moore v. 
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487-97 (Cal. 1990) (discussing whether to grant individuals 
property rights over their bodily cells). 
12 Penner, supra note 7, at 799 (“[I]t is incontrovertible that calling something ‘property’ 
ramifies in all sorts of ways, legal, political, social, and cultural.”). 
13 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 
533 (2005) (“[E]veryone knows what [property] is, but no one can define it.”). 
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has over a given resource (or thing), and not the resource itself.14 Theorists 
also agree that property rights are rights in rem,15 or rights against the 
world—that is to say, rights held by the property owner that apply against 
any other person.16 An in rem right attaches to the thing—unlike an in 
personam right that attaches to an individual (the right-holder).17 Other 
points of agreement include the notion that property can be either tangible 
or intangible; that property is more than just possession; and that property 
can be private, common, or public.18 All of these points of agreement lie on 
what I call a “descriptive plane”: they describe the form and effect of a 
property right.19 However, scholars disagree on “the nature and content”20 
of these rights, arguing on what I call the “normative plane” of property.21 
Given the lack of consensus on what these rights entail—and as I do not 
advocate any one of the current theories—four conceptualizations of “the 
nature and content” of property define the normative plane: the right to 
exclude, the bundle of rights, autonomous interests, and economic interests. 
 
14 See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY 8-11 (2010) (describing the 
centrality of “thingness” to the concept of property); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to 
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731-32 (1998) (“[N]early everyone agrees that the institution of 
property is not concerned with scarce resources themselves (‘things’), but rather with the rights of 
persons with respect to such resources.”). 
15 The alternative to a right in rem is a right in personam—a right residing in a person against a 
definite group of persons (or a single person). See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 718-20 (1917) (defining paucital (in 
personam) and multital (in rem) rights).  
16 See Balganesh, Demystifying, supra note 1, at 603 (“Hohfeld characterized property relations 
as multital [in rem], because they involved the owner interacting with an indeterminate set of 
individuals (potential trespassers).”); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 545 (describing the 
“in rem” view of property as “a staple of property theory”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 790 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & 
Smith, Property/Contract Interface] (describing property as an in rem right); see also IMMANUEL 
KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 58 ( John Ladd trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d 
ed. 1999) (1797) (“The usual definition of a right in a thing (iues reale, ius in re) is that ‘it is a right 
against every possessor of the thing.’”). 
17 Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract Interface, supra note 16, at 787; see also KANT, supra note 
16, at 59 (“[A]nd so my right would be like a guardian spirit accompanying the thing.”). 
18 See Merrill, supra note 14, at 731-33 (describing the consensus among property scholars 
regarding the form of property rights, but not their content).  
19 See infra Section I.E. 
20 Merrill, supra note 14, at 734. 
21 By “normative,” I mean the norms or standards that guide individuals’ behavior toward 
conformity, not the value judgments that give rise to these norms.  
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A. The Right to Exclude 
Some property theorists equate property with the right to exclude others 
from the thing owned.22 Blackstone defined property as the “sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in 
the universe.”23 While some argue that the right to exclude “is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition of property,”24 others argue that it is only 
a necessary condition.25  
Generally, scholars liken the right to exclude to the legal consequence of 
granting the property holder injunctive relief against a trespass.26 Although 
the right does encompass such injunctive relief, it is not synonymous with 
the right to judicial relief.27  
The guiding principle under the right to exclude is that others should 
not trespass onto one’s property, and that, depending on the circumstances, 
one has the right to resort to self-help to exclude others from one’s property, 
or to seek remedial relief. 
B. The Bundle of Rights 
Under this conceptualization, the owner holds an assortment (or bundle) 
of rights as to the thing. The Supreme Court described the bundle as “a 
collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute 
property.”28 The right to exclude is just one of several rights in this collec-
tion; furthermore, one cannot determine ex ante whether removing a given 
right would so alter the bundle that it would effectively undermine the 
 
22 See, e.g., Balganesh, Demystifying, supra note 1, at 596 (“The idea of exclusion, in one form 
or the other, tends to inform almost any understanding of property.”); Merrill, supra note 14, at 730 
(“[T]he right to exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of 
property—it is the sine qua non.”); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of 
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 981 (2004) (“Exclusion is a low-cost, but low-precision, method 
that relies on rough informational variables like boundaries to define legal entitlements.”). 
23 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
24 Merrill, supra note 14, at 740. 
25 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (describing the right to 
exclude as “a fundamental element of the property right”); Balganesh, Demystifying, supra note 1, at 
596 (“The idea of exclusion, in one form or the other, tends to inform almost any understanding of 
property, whether private, public, or community.”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, 
But Not Quite Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1899 (2012) [hereinafter Balganesh, Quasi-
Property] (“Central to the idea of property is exclusion.”). 
26 Balganesh, Demystifying, supra note 1, at 638.  
27 See id. at 610 (“Legal rules can be meaningful well before their breach is contemplated.”).  
28 United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002). 
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“propertied” nature of the thing.29 A.M. Honoré enumerated these rights or 
“incidents” attendant to property as 
the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the 
income of the thing, the right to the capital, the right to security, the rights 
or incidents of transmissibility and absence of term, the prohibition of harm-
ful use, liability to execution, and the incident of residuarity.30 
Courts often describe exclusion as an “essential stick” in the bundle; however, 
under this conceptualization, property is not destroyed by the subtraction of 
the right to exclude.31 Once “property is affected with a public interest,”32 the 
right to exclude is seen as secondary to other rights and privileges. Ultimately, 
according to the legal realists—the main proponents of the bundle of rights 
conceptualization—“property has been destroyed as a useful concept,” 
because property, “merely describes a collection of legally protected interests 
that can be disaggregated into their component parts. . . . Under this 
conception, property as a category has no utility except to obfuscate the 
underlying policy choices that must be made at the level of the detailed 
individual rules.”33 
J.E. Penner criticizes the bundle-of-rights theorists for denigrating the 
concept of property.34 For him, the concept of property in and of itself has 
operative force.35 Indeed, Penner describes property as  
the right to determine the use or disposition of an alienable thing in so far 
as that can be achieved or aided by others excluding themselves from it, and 
includes the right to abandon it, to share it, to license it to others (either 
exclusively or not), and to give it to others in its entirety.36 
Ironically, this alternative definition of property continues to be an aggrega-
tion of rights. The legal realists believe that property is a compilation of 
 
29 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 545-46. 
30 A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113 (A.G. Guest ed., 
1961). 
31 See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82, 83 (1980) (describing the 
right to exclude as “one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights,” but nevertheless 
requiring a mall owner to allow petitioners to “exercise [their] state-protected rights of free 
expression and petition”). 
32 Penner, supra note 7, at 717 (quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 
(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
33 Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1458-59 (1996). 
34 Penner believed that “the bundle of rights picture obscures more than it illuminates” our 
understanding of property. Penner, supra note 7, at 724. 
35 See id. at 800-02. 
36 Id. at 742. 
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rights, and that courts use these rights as an excuse to perform their objec-
tives. Although Penner criticizes this conclusion—property itself has 
normative value (outside the rights that it protects) in his conceptualiza-
tion—he, too, views property as a grouping of rights.  
C. The Autonomous Interests 
A third theory of property depends on the autonomous interest concep-
tualization. According to Kantian thought, property is an outgrowth of 
humans’ “innate right” to freedom,37 “the ‘one sole and original right that 
belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity.’”38 For Kant, only 
three kinds of objects could become a person’s property: “a corporeal thing 
external to me,” “the will of another with respect to a particular act,” and 
“the status of another in relation to me.”39 As to the first object, Kant 
elaborated that “an external thing is mine . . . if ‘any interference with my 
using it as I please would constitute an injury to me.’”40 Kant described the 
process of acquiring an outside object in the following manner: 
Whatever I can bring under my [control or] authority (in conformity with 
the law of external freedom) and with respect to which as an object of my 
will I have the ability to make use of (in conformity with the Postulate of 
practical reason), and finally (what in accordance with the Idea of a possible 
united Will) I will that it be mine, that will be mine.41 
Put differently, “if I possess an object, then ‘anyone who touches it without 
my consent . . . affects and diminishes that which is internally mine (my 
freedom).’”42 Therefore, property bestows upon its holder the right to deal 
with the thing autonomously.43  
 
37 Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 414 
(1999). 
38 Id. at 414 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 44 
( John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797)). 
39 Howard Williams, Kant’s Concept of Property, 27 PHIL. Q. 32, 32-33 (1977). For purposes of 
this Comment, I assume that Kantian property includes intangibles. Perhaps this assumption is 
unfair. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1894 n.165 (1987) 
(“[T]here had seemed to be no place at all for intangible property in Kant’s theory of possessio 
noumenon.”). 
40 Williams, supra note 39, at 33 (citation omitted). 
41 KANT, supra note 16, at 56 (footnote omitted).  
42 Haemmerli, supra note 37, at 418 (quoting KANT, supra note 38, at 57).  
43 See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 93 (2009) (“Your right to property is your right to limit the conduct of others in 
relation to particular things.”). But see Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, 
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A related conceptualization of property is the personhood concept.44 
Hegel writes that “[a] person has . . . the right of putting his will into any 
and every thing and thereby making it his.”45 Margaret Radin draws from 
Hegel to conclude that property rights arise when an individual attaches her 
personhood to a thing.46 Property becomes a sliding scale of entitlements 
positively correlated to an individual’s personhood investment in the object. 
Radin concludes, “[t]he more closely connected with personhood, the 
stronger the entitlement.”47  
Common to Kant’s, Hegel’s, and Radin’s conceptualizations of property 
is the notion that property protects one’s freedom, will, or personhood by 
imposing the social norm of noninterference, as interference (even harmless 
interference) will injure the property holder.48  
D. The Economic Interests 
Yet another theory of property is the economic interest theory. Under this 
theory, property is that which is valuable to the holder and to society at large. 
In Harold Demsetz’s words, “A primary function of property rights is that of 
guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”49 
Although Demsetz’s theory is descriptive,50 scholars relying on his work 
 
Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 61 (2001) (“[P]ervasive recognition of property rights 
in the information environment imposes an overall cost on autonomy.”). 
44 See Haemmerli, supra note 37, at 418 (“This means that, in a Kantian system, property is 
inseparably associated with one’s ‘personhood’ because property grows out of freedom and 
freedom is essential to personhood.”). 
45 G.W.F. HEGEL, OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT para. 44 (Stephen Houlgate 
ed., T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1821); see also Haemmerli, supra note 37, at 424 
(“Property in this view is an extension of the personality and is essential to the actualization of the 
person.”). 
46 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 960 (1982) 
(“Once we admit that a person can be bound up with an external ‘thing’ in some constitutive sense, 
we can argue that by virtue of this connection the person should be accorded broad liberty with 
respect to control over that ‘thing.’”). 
47 Id. at 986. Radin explains that, for instance, Joe’s wedding ring has a stronger personhood 
investment than a wedding ring in the hands of a jewelry seller since “the price of a replacement 
will not restore the status quo.” Id. at 959.  
48 See RIPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 92 (explaining that, according to Kant, even harmless 
interference with an individual’s property is impermissible). 
49 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967). 
50 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 264 n.21 
(2007) (characterizing Demsetz’s theory as descriptive); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The 
Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S333 (2002) (“[Demsetz’s] 
article is about the evolution of ‘property,’ but at different times it offers different definitions of the 
institution of property that have different implications for the scope of the argument.”). 
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describe property as a value-enhancing mechanism.51 For instance, Carol M. 
Rose argues that property maximizes value by “facilitat[ing] trade and 
minimiz[ing] resource-wasting conflict.”52 And Abraham Bell and Gideon 
Parchomovsky posit that “property increases value by creating and defending 
stable ownership.”53 Bell and Parchomovsky conclude that “only assets for 
which protection of stable ownership will enhance social welfare should 
come under the aegis of property law.”54 As such, property should not 
include nonmarket goods, goods for which there is no in rem protection, 
over-fragmented assets,55 and assets for which policing costs outweigh the 
benefits derived from property protection.56 Under the economic interest 
conceptualization, property protects the value of an owned thing. We have a 
duty not to interfere with the value of another’s thing, and the property 
holder has a right to protect this value.57 
E. The Property Matrix 
The property matrix takes into account the two dimensions (or planes) 
of property: the descriptive and the normative.58 The descriptive plane 
refers to the form and effect of the property right. It details the rights and 
privileges of the property holder, the duties that the public owes to the 
property and the property holder, and how rights are transferred between 
holders. The descriptive characteristics of property can be summed up as 
follows: property describes the rights of a person over a given thing; property 
rights are rights in rem; property rights attach to the thing; property can be 
tangible or intangible; and property can be public, common, or private.59 
Because I cannot conceive of a thing that is neither tangible nor intangible, 
 
51 See, e.g., CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, 
THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 51-55 (1994) (analyzing the wealth-enhancing 
conception of property); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 552-53 (naming Harold Demsetz, 
Yoram Barzel, Steven Shavell, Robert Ellickson, and Carol Rose as scholars who view property as 
a utility-enhancing mechanism). 
52 ROSE, supra note 51, at 16. 
53 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 552. 
54 Id. at 563.  
55 An over-fragmented asset is an asset that has been too thinly divided, such that it has lost 
all of its value. See id. at 564 (“[A]s the asset becomes too small, it is unlikely to have any 
value . . . [and] moves beyond the range of the legal property system.”).  
56 Id. at 564-65. 
57 It may be illustrative to compare the economic-interest with the autonomy-interest theory 
of property. Under the former, a harmless interference with another’s property would be inconse-
quential; under the latter, even a “harmless” interference injures the other. See supra note 48. 
58 Again, I use “normative” as a guiding standard. See supra note 21. 
59 See supra sources accompanying notes 4-8.  
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nor can I conceive of a thing that is neither public, common, nor private, I 
omit these characteristics from the property matrix. Instead, I use the first 
three characteristics to inform the descriptive plane: for a thing to be 
considered property under the matrix, it must give rise to a right (or set of 
rights) of a person over a given thing. 
Viewing the descriptive and the normative dimensions together will 
help us determine whether a given thing should be considered property. 
Furthermore, we may also be able to understand why a court may grant an 
injunction, damages, or neither. 
It is important to make a quick aside to describe what I mean when I 
refer to a “right.” Shyamkrishna Balganesh outlines three different types of 
rights associated with property: a claim-right, a privilege-right, and a 
remedial right.60 A claim-right is the general right that a property holder 
has against interference from others. Put simply, a claim-right imposes a 
duty on others not to interfere with my property.61 It is George’s duty not 
to go into Mary’s home without her permission. The privilege-right is the 
right to which a property holder is entitled in order to protect his or her 
property from intrusion.62 Mary, for instance, may (generally speaking) 
resort to self-help to kick George out of her home. Finally, the remedial 
right is the right to an enforceable resolution of a challenge to property that 
the property holder can seek from the judiciary.63 If George were to build a 
wall encroaching on Mary’s land, Mary would have a right to seek injunctive 
relief. Each of these rights, moreover, must be in rem (they apply to every 
other person) and must attach to the thing (they can be severed from the 
right-holder).64  
The normative plane explains what gives traction to these rights. Scholars 
have adopted different explanations of what these rights entail, including 
the right to exclude, a bundle of rights, rights of autonomy, and rights of 
value enhancement.65  I hypothesize that what I call “strong property” 
 
60 See Balganesh, Demystifying, supra note 1, at 610 tbl.1 (displaying and describing the three 
different kinds of rights).  
61 See id. (defining a claim-right as “the correlative duty (of non-interference) imposed on 
others”). 
62 See id. (characterizing the privilege-right as “the exercise of use-privileges to achieve 
exclusion”). 
63 See id. (calling the remedial right “the entitlement to commence action”). 
64 In a recent paper, Yun-chien Chang and Henry E. Smith describe the “three essential 
features” of property as being “in rem status, the right to exclude, and running with assets.” Yun-
chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (Feb. 17, 2012 draft at 24), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017816.  
65 See supra Sections I.A–D. 
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should be explainable under a majority—at least three—of our normative 
points. When a thing is a strong property, all conceptualizations should 
agree that it is property, though they may differ as to the normative value(s) 
driving this conclusion.  
To summarize, in order for a given thing comfortably to be characterized 
as property, it should lie on all of the points of the descriptive plane, because 
these are the components of property on which scholars agree.66 Additionally, 
the more points of the normative plane on which a given thing lies, the 
stronger the property right that attaches to it. Table 1 is an illustration of 
this benchmark: 
 
Table 1: The Property Matrix 
Descriptive 
Rights of a person over a 
given thing 
In rem Attach to the thing 
1 or 0 1 or 0 1 or 0 
 
Normative 
Right to Exclude Bundle of Rights 
Autonomous 
Interests 
Economic 
Interests 
1 or 0 1 or 0 1 or 0 1 or 0 
 
Under this binary approach, I grant a one if a thing conforms to a given 
quality, and a zero if the thing lacks the given quality. When I analyze 
different instances in which courts have defined certain rights as property 
rights, I will err in favor of finding compliance with the point (in other 
words, I will grant a one). Any instance with fewer than three total points is 
not property because the analyzed thing does not lie on the descriptive 
plane. As a given thing moves from four to seven points, I am increasingly 
comfortable with calling it property and with labeling it a stronger form of 
property. The stronger the property, the more privileges a property holder 
should have to protect his interest in the thing.67 When holding a weak 
property right, an owner should only have a claim-right; but when holding a 
strong property right, his rights should include a remedial right. 
This tool allows for a quick summary of how a given thing could be 
reviewed under our current understanding of property. When using the 
matrix, I first ask whether a given thing satisfies the elements of the 
 
66 See supra notes 2-8. 
67 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 60-63. 
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descriptive plane. If the thing conforms to the three descriptive characteris-
tics, I then analyze whether bestowing property rights upon it is consistent 
with the normative plane. 
As an example, I analyze Blackacre, the paradigmatic property, under the 
matrix. Blackacre satisfies all the elements of the descriptive plane. Mary, 
Blackacre’s owner, has several rights over Blackacre, including the right to 
exclude, the right to alienate, and the right to use.68 Generally speaking, Mary’s 
rights over Blackacre are in rem (against the world). And the rights that Mary 
has over Blackacre are attached to Blackacre; if Mary were to sell Blackacre to 
George, Mary’s rights over Blackacre would be transferred to George. 
Mary’s property rights over Blackacre can also be understood under the 
four conceptualizations of property. Many would argue that Mary’s para-
mount right over Blackacre is the right to exclude others from her property.69 
Mary’s property interest in Blackacre would most likely survive even if we 
withdrew Mary’s right to exclude.70 Under the Kantian interpretation of 
property, Mary has the right to exclude any trespasser, including a harmless 
trespasser, because the trespasser “violate[s] the owner’s right to determine 
how his or her property will be used.”71 Mary derives value from owning 
Blackacre, from either using the land to generate income, from holding it to 
sell in the future, or perhaps from imputed income.72 
 
Table 2: Blackacre Matrix Analysis 
Descriptive 
Rights of a person over a 
given thing 
In rem Attach to the thing 
1  1  1  
 
Normative 
Right to Exclude Bundle of Rights 
Autonomous 
Interests 
Economic 
Interests 
1  1 1 1 
 
 
68 Here I am not attempting to define the series of rights that define property, but rather am 
merely affirming that Mary’s ownership of Blackacre conveys certain rights to Mary. See, e.g., 
Honoré, supra note 30, at 113 (listing rights associated with property). 
69 See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Wis. 1997) (“[I]n certain 
situations of trespass, the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land, which may be 
minimal, but in the loss of the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her property.”). 
70 See supra Section I.B. 
71 RIPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 92. 
72 See supra Section I.D. 
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Thus, under the property matrix, Blackacre scores a seven out of seven and 
is clearly a strong property.  
II. ANALYZING INTANGIBLE “PROPERTY” RIGHTS  
UNDER THE MATRIX 
A. Property Under the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes 
The federal mail and wire fraud statutes criminalize the use of the federal 
mail or interstate wire or electronic communications to execute any scheme 
to deprive a person of his or her property or money.73 “The elements of 
mail or wire fraud are (i) a scheme to defraud (ii) to get money or property, 
(iii) furthered by the use of interstate mail or wires.”74 The broad scope of 
these statutes makes them particularly effective in prosecutions of white-
collar crimes.75 Before 1987, federal courts relied on the mail and wire fraud 
statutes to convict government officials who had defrauded constituents “of 
their right to an honest government” or other “intangible right[s].”76 In 
1987, however, the Supreme Court held in McNally v. United States that the 
mail and wire fraud statutes were limited to the protection of “property 
rights,” and did not extend to intangible rights.77 To avoid confusion, the 
Supreme Court clarified in Carpenter v. United States that the statutes do 
protect intangible property rights.78 In response to McNally, Congress enacted 
 
73 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006). 
74 United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Aside from 
the difference in the method of communication, courts construe the mail and wire fraud statutes 
identically. United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1983). 
75 See, e.g., 1 JOEL ANDROPHY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 8:1 (2d ed. 2011) (describing the 
mail fraud as “a powerful tool employed by prosecutors against a litany of crimes”); MICHAEL S. 
KIM & JONATHAN D. COGAN, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: DEBTOR-CREDITOR FRAUD § 1:13 
(2009–2010 ed. 2009) (describing the mail fraud statute as a “versatile tool”); 21 MARVIN 
PICKHOLZ, SECURITIES CRIMES § 5:28 (November 2011) (“A prominent feature on the terrain 
of federal law enforcement since its enactment in 1872, the mail fraud statute remains the 
prosecutors’ tool of choice against business and regulatory offenses because of its breadth, 
flexibility and ease of application to almost every variant of fraudulent conduct.”). 
76 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 366 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting), superseded by 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346; see also id. at 362-67 nn.1-5 (recounting “scores of . . . examples of such 
schemes which, although not depriving anyone of money or property, are clearly schemes to 
defraud, and are clearly within the scope of Congress’ purpose in enacting the mail fraud statute”). 
77 Id. at 356 (majority opinion) (“The mail fraud statute clearly protects property rights, but 
does not refer to the intangible right of the citizenry to good government.”). 
78 See 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (“McNally did not limit the scope of § 1341 to tangible as distin-
guished from intangible property rights.”). 
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§ 1346, in which it declared that mail and wire fraud includes “a scheme or 
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”79  
Recently, however, the Supreme Court held that § 1346 is only actionable 
in cases involving a kickback or a bribery scheme.80 In Skilling v. United 
States, the Court specifically rejected the government’s proposal that § 1346 
should encompass “undisclosed self-dealing by a public official or private 
employee.”81 This outcome has led to uncertainty among prosecutors.82 
With this new limitation on § 1346, prosecutors will most likely resort to 
classic §§ 1341 and 1342 analyses, rather than honest service fraud, but they 
will have to show that the defendants targeted property.83 This change will 
necessarily raise the question of what can be labeled property. For instance, 
under Second Circuit jurisprudence, a defendant commits mail fraud by 
depriving a shareholder of information that could have been valuable in 
deciding how to manage her stock—what that court calls the shareholder’s 
“right to control.”84 
1. The Right to Control—United States v. Wallach 
In 1980, Eugene Wallach began lobbying on behalf of Wedtech, a small 
metal manufacturer, for new government contracts. 85  Wallach was not 
compensated for his original services, but in 1983, upon his insistence—and 
 
79 Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603 , 102 Stat. 4508 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346). 
80 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010). 
81 Id. at 2932 (citation omitted). 
82 See Randy M. Mastro & Lee G. Dunst, White Collar Crime (“In the aftermath of Skilling 
and Black [v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010)], federal prosecutors are scrambling to preserve 
many of their hard-fought white collar convictions under the honest-services theory.”), in 10 
BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 112:36 (Robert L. Haig 
ed., 3d ed. 2012). 
83 See Siegelman & Scrushy—Post Skilling—Is 1346 Really Necessary? WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
PROF BLOG ( Jan. 20, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2011/01/ 
siegelman-scrushy-post-skilling-is-1346-really-necessary.html (“The Supreme Court has clearly 
held that ‘money or property’ includes intangible property . . . . To include ‘intangible rights’ is 
therefore unnecessary for the prosecution of criminal misconduct.” (internal citation omitted)). 
84 See United States v. Speight, 75 F. App’x 802, 804-05 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing the right 
to control one’s assets as property); United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(relying on the “right to control” doctrine to affirm a conviction under the mail fraud statute); 
United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1258-61 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming the “right to control” 
theory); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 463 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that “the withholding 
or inaccurate reporting of information that could impact on economic decisions can provide the 
basis for a mail fraud prosecution”); see also United States v. Bayly, No. 03-363, 2008 WL 89624, at 
*4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2008) (concluding “that accurate shareholder information is a legally 
cognizable intangible ‘property’ right within the meaning of the wire fraud statute”), aff’d sub nom. 
United States v. Brown, 571 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2009).  
85 Wallach, 935 F.2d at 450. 
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shortly after Wedtech completed its initial public offering—Wedtech agreed 
to pay $125,000 for Wallach’s lobbying efforts.86 However, two Wedtech 
officers, Mario Moreno and Anthony Guariglia, requested that Wallach 
attribute the expenses solely to consultation services related to the company’s 
initial public offering.87 This misrepresentation allowed Wedtech to capitalize 
the consultation fee, instead of expensing it—a maneuver which, in turn, 
“had the effect of inflating Wedtech’s profits per share.”88  
In 1985, Wallach introduced Guariglia and Moreno to defendant Rusty 
London, a real estate specialist, and defendant Wayne Chinn, a financial 
analyst.89 Wedtech soon thereafter entered into a retention agreement with 
both London and Chinn, under which they were to provide financial advice 
and improve the company’s image in the investment community.90 Wedtech 
subsequently named Chinn a director in the company.91 In December 1985, 
Guariglia and Moreno entered into an additional agreement with London 
and Chinn to assist in Wedtech’s second public offering, scheduled for 
January 1986.92 According to the agreement, London and Chinn would, in 
exchange for $1.14 million, create a demand for Wedtech’s stock by “parking” 
on the newly issued stock.93 Defendants, once again, mischaracterized this 
transaction to avoid SEC disclosure requirements.94 
In 1986, Wedtech was subject to multiple federal investigations, and 
soon thereafter filed for bankruptcy.95 Guariglia and Moreno pled guilty to 
several different criminal charges, cooperated with the government, and 
became the primary witnesses against Wallach, London, and Chinn,96 who 
were charged with multiple counts of mail fraud relating to their scheme to 
receive $1.14 million from Wedtech.97 
  
 
86 Id. at 451.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 452. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 453. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 454, 460. 
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London and Chinn later appealed the mail fraud convictions and argued 
that the “charges [we]re legally insufficient because the government only 
allege[d] a fraudulent taking of intangible rights—interests that do not rise to 
the level of ‘property’ within the meaning of the mail fraud statute.”98 
Defendants argued that “the shareholders’ intangible ‘right to control’ how 
Wedtech’s money was spent” was not susceptible to a mail fraud charge, as per 
McNally.99 The court rejected the argument, reasoning that the defendants 
had defined “property . . . too narrowly.”100  
It is important to clarify that the court did not reason that the target of 
the scheme was the shareholders’ property interest in the shares them-
selves.101 This theory would not have satisfied the elements of mail fraud, 
because London and Chinn had not taken the shareholders’ securities.102 
Rather, the government deemed the right to control to be a property 
interest. It argued that “the actions taken by the defendants denied the 
shareholders the ‘right to control’ how corporate assets were spent.”103 This 
particular right to control governed “an intangible property interest.”104 
According to the Wallach court, the right to control theory “is predicated 
on a showing that some person or entity has been deprived of potentially 
valuable economic information.”105 The Second Circuit concluded, based on 
this reasoning, that “the withholding or inaccurate reporting of information 
that could impact on economic decisions can provide the basis for a mail 
fraud prosecution.”106 At this point the court moved from describing the 
“right to control” as a property interest to describing it as an “incident of 
stock ownership.”107 The court then incorporated the bundle of rights terminol-
ogy—further muddling its property analysis—by postulating that “the right 
to complete and accurate information is one of the most essential sticks in 
the bundle of rights that comprise a stockholder’s property interest.”108  
 
98 Id. at 460. 
99 Id. at 461. 
100 Id. 
101 The Supreme Court has defined shares as property. See Hawley v. City of Malden, 232 
U.S. 1, 10 (1914) (noting that previous state cases assumed that “shares are personal property”); 11 
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 5096 (rev. vol. 2011) (“Under the common law, and some state corporations codes, shares are 
deemed personal property having the same characteristics as any other property.”). 
102 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006). 
103 Wallach, 935 F.2d at 462. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 462-63. 
106 Id. at 463. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
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Ultimately, the Second Circuit concluded that “the government advanced 
a viable theory of fraud under the mail fraud statute.”109 Given the court’s 
inconsistent terminology, it remains unclear what exactly was the property 
interest that made the mail and wire fraud actionable. Two possible 
explanations for the court’s conclusion include: (1) by depriving the share-
holders of the information, the defendants had effectively deprived them of 
their shares, or (2) the information was, in and of itself, the shareholders’ 
property.  
The first theory explains the court’s use of the bundle of rights termi-
nology. The court would be drawing parallels to takings case law holding 
that the taking of the property owner’s right to exclude effectively deprives 
the property owner of her property.110 The court, however, would be hard-
pressed to find that this case was such an instance because, by their inaccurate 
reporting, London and Chinn did not eviscerate the shareholders’ stocks, 
but rather, at most, diminished their value.111 Given the prevalence of the 
right-to-control theory in the Second Circuit,112 the right to exclude most 
likely did not animate the Wallach court’s reasoning.  
Under the second theory, the information of which London and Chinn 
deprived the shareholders by their inaccurate reporting is the property 
protected by the court.113 The shareholders’ property interest as to this 
information triggered their “right to control.”114 I assume that the court 
espoused this latter theory. But is it appropriate to label shareholders’ “right 
to control” as property? 
  
 
109 Id. at 464. 
110 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that the 
government must compensate property owners for taking away only their right to exclude, even if 
they retain a bundle of other use-rights). 
111 Even a reduction in value is dubious, as defendants provided services that potentially 
increased shareholder value. See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 462 (“[A]ccording to London and Chinn, 
[shareholders] were in fact benefitted as a result of their efforts to enhance the value of the 
corporation’s stock.”). 
112 See supra note 84. 
113 The Second Circuit’s distillation of Wallach supports this conclusion. See, e.g., United 
States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1258 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[Shareholders] have property rights of 
which they may not be fraudulently deprived by ‘the withholding or inaccurate reporting of 
information that could impact on economic decisions.’” (quoting Wallach, 935 F.2d at 463)). 
114 Id.  
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2. Wallach’s Right to Control Under the Property Matrix 
Table 3: Wallach’s “Right to Control” Matrix Analysis 
Descriptive 
Rights of a person over a 
given thing 
In rem Attach to the thing 
1 0 0 
 
Normative 
Right to Exclude Bundle of Rights 
Autonomous 
Interests 
Economic 
Interests 
0 0 1  1  
a. The Wallach Interest on the Descriptive Plane 
The right-to-control theory fails the descriptive dimension of the property 
matrix.115 The relationship between the shareholder and the information—
the thing—triggers a right of accurate reporting, recognized by the Second 
Circuit as the right to control.116 The shareholder, however, does not have a 
positive right to the information; rather, her right to control imposes a 
positive obligation (a claim-right) on the information holder (here, 
Wallach, London, and Chinn)117 of accurate reporting. Therefore, because 
the thing—the information that the defendants should have reported—
results in a claim-right, it conforms to the first characteristic of the 
descriptive plane, and thus receives a one. 
The right to control, however, is not a right in rem. The only set of people 
who could infringe on this right are those with information that could affect 
a shareholder’s decisionmaking, like London and Chinn. In other words, 
there first has to be an information holder before there is an accurate 
reporting duty, which would trigger the shareholder’s right to control.118 
The logical conclusion here is that the right to control cannot possibly be a 
right against the world. Additionally, as noted by the Wallach court, corporate 
law further limits the group of people to whom this right applies.119 As such, 
 
115 Cf. supra Section I.E. 
116 Wallach, 935 F.2d at 463. 
117 Id. 
118 Cf. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” 
Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1267 (2001) (arguing for the assignment of 
property-derived obligations “to insiders with respect to inside information”). 
119 See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 463 (“The importance of this right to information is recognized 
by the statutes and rules that govern the operation of a publicly held corporation.”). 
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the right to control is a right in personam and not a right in rem because 
the right applies only against a finite and (probably) identifiable set of 
individuals.120 The right to control could be quasi-property, an “interest[] 
[that is] ‘in the air’ . . . until a defendant is identified.”121 Therefore, this 
interest receives a zero under the in rem characteristic on the descriptive 
plane. 
The third characteristic on the descriptive plane is that the rights attach 
to the thing.122 For instance, when an owner transfers the thing, the right 
attached to the thing ought to transfer with it. In the context of the right to 
control, how are we to identify the right-holder if the right is still “in the 
air” until it is triggered?123 On the other hand, if we define the right to 
control as a “claim-right,” and there is an obligation on the information 
holder, then how would this right ever transfer?124 Under the right-to-
control theory, we cannot identify the right-holder until the right has been 
triggered; this conundrum logically inhibits the discussion of a right 
transfer. In contrast, under the claim-right theory, we can identify the 
right-holder, but a transfer is impossible, as the right is attached to the 
information holder. In light of such ambiguity, I conclude that the Wallach 
interest does not satisfy the third and final characteristic on the descriptive 
plane, and thus merits a zero. 
b. The Wallach Interest on the Normative Plane 
The property interest identified by the Wallach court is the “share-
holders[’] . . . ‘right to control’ how corporate assets [a]re spent.”125 In 
Wallach, this interest results in the obligation (or norm) of accurate reporting.126 
The right-to-exclude theory, however, cannot explain this property interest 
and the right to control that attaches to it.127 Put simply, this norm imposes 
an affirmative duty on the information holder but no right (claim, privilege, 
 
120 See supra note 15.  
121 Balganesh, Quasi-Property, supra note 25, at 1900 (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 
162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)). 
122 See supra Section I.E. 
123 See Balganesh, Quasi-Property, supra note 25, at 1900.  
124 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
125 United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 462 (2d Cir. 1991). 
126 See id. at 463 (“If corporate officers and directors, and those acting in concert with them, 
were free to conceal the true nature of corporate transactions, it is conceivable that the assets of 
the corporation could be so dissipated as to render a shareholder’s investment valueless.”). 
127 See supra Section I.A. 
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or remedial) on the shareholder.128 As such, this “right” receives a zero under 
the first conceptualization on the normative plane. 
The right to control does not fare better under the bundle-of-rights 
conceptualization of property.129 In the current case, the property interest 
defined by the Wallach court triggers only one right: the right to control.130 
Although the concept of the right to control the information associated with 
the stock may be similar to Honoré’s “right to manage,”131 the existence of 
only one right associated with the property interest indicates that the 
bundle of rights theory cannot explain the Wallach interest. This is so 
because there cannot be a bundle if there is only one right, and the Wallach 
interest thus receives another zero. 
The right to control can be understood under an autonomous-interests 
conceptualization of property. Under this conceptualization, property is that 
which protects an individual’s freedom, will, or personhood.132 Because of 
the defendants’ inaccurate reporting, Wedtech’s shareholders were deprived 
of their freedom to exercise their shareholder rights; under the Second 
Circuit’s terminology, shareholders were deprived of their right to control.133 
Particularly under Kant’s vision, London and Chinn’s interference is 
impermissible as it injured the property owner’s autonomy.134 The share-
holders did not have all the information pertaining to their company that 
would have enabled them to protect their interests. Thus, the Wallach 
property interest satisfies the third point of the normative plane and 
receives a one. 
The right to control is also understandable under the economic-interests 
theory of property. Under this conceptualization, the objective of property 
is to maximize value to the holder by either minimizing transaction costs or 
promoting the stability of property.135 The right to control maximizes value 
for the shareholder, as it increases the amount of information available to a 
shareholder deciding whether to hold or sell her stock.136 Consequently, the 
Wallach property interest also lies on the fourth point of the normative 
 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 60-63. 
129 See supra Section I.B. 
130 Wallach, 935 F.2d at 462. 
131 See supra text accompanying note 30. 
132 See supra Section I.C. 
133 See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 462 (arguing that accurate information is necessary to permit 
shareholders to prevent harmful corporate activity). 
134 See supra Section I.C. 
135 See supra Section I.D. 
136 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 521-26 (1945) 
(postulating that knowledge accumulation maximizes a system’s efficiency); cf. Goshen & 
Parchomovsky, supra note 118, at 1263 (describing the importance of information accessibility). 
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plane, and scores a one. In conclusion, the Wallach interest scores only three 
points under the property matrix. Therefore, the right to control should not 
be considered property.  
3. Confidential Business Information—Carpenter v. United States 
Although the Second Circuit used the mail and wire fraud statutes in 
Wallach to protect accurate information reporting,137 courts have also relied 
on the same statutes to protect confidential business information from mis-
appropriation.138 In Carpenter v. United States, R. Foster Winans, defendant-
petitioner, was one of two writers of the Wall Street Journal’s column “Heard 
on the Street,” which analyzed different stocks and made investment 
recommendations.139 Despite the Journal’s “official policy and practice” that 
the contents of the “Heard” column were to remain confidential until publi-
cation, Winans entered into a scheme with two brokers to provide them 
with column information in advance of its publication.140 The brokers then 
used the information “to buy or sell based on the probable impact of the 
column on the market.”141 The plan proved to be lucrative; over a four-
month period, the coconspirators netted $690,000.142 Winans was convicted 
in the Southern District of New York for violations of § 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Rule 10b-5, and the federal mail and wire 
fraud statutes.143 On appeal, he argued that because he had not received 
any “money or property”—elements necessary under §§ 1341 and 1343—
from the newspaper, he could not have committed mail fraud. 144 The 
Supreme Court refuted this argument. It reasoned that “[t]he Journal had a 
property right in keeping confidential and making exclusive use, prior to 
publication, of the schedule and contents of the ‘Heard’ column.”145 
 
137 See supra subsection II.A.1. 
138 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (listing cases recognizing confidential 
business information as property). 
139 Id. at 22. As part of his research, Winans met with executives but the interviews did not 
discuss “inside information.” Id. 
140 Id. at 23. 
141 See id. at 22. While the defendants did not have access to insider information, the column 
itself affected market behavior. The Court noted that “[b]ecause of the ‘Heard’ column’s perceived 
quality and integrity, it had the potential of affecting the price of the stocks which it examined.” Id. 
142 Id. at 23. 
143 See United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff ’d sub nom. Carpenter, 
484 U.S. 19. 
144 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25 (citation omitted). 
145 Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
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4. Confidential Information Under the Property Matrix 
Table 4: Carpenter’s Confidential Business Information Matrix Analysis 
Descriptive 
Rights of a person over a 
given thing 
In rem Attach to the thing 
1 1 1 
 
Normative 
Right to Exclude Bundle of Rights 
Autonomous 
Interests 
Economic 
Interests 
1 1 1 1  
a. The Confidential Information in Carpenter on the Descriptive Plane 
The Court in Carpenter reasoned that because the Journal created and 
owned the confidential information from the “Heard” column, the Journal 
held a proprietary interest in this information. This interest conveyed to the 
Journal rights of confidentiality and exclusive use.146 By signaling the Journal’s 
right to exclusive use, the Court indicated that this right applied against the 
world.147 In a similar context, Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh argues 
against the use of misappropriation theory to create a property interest in 
the news. Through the prism of International News Service v. Associated Press, 
he convincingly argues that a misappropriation theory cannot give rise to a 
property interest in news, because the Court sought to protect the Associ-
ated Press from “unjust enrichment” and “unfair competition” by Interna-
tional News Services.148 However, the Court’s reasoning in Carpenter is 
distinguishable from the Court’s reasoning in International News. 149  The 
 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 26-27. Regarding the right to exclude, the Court noted that “it is sufficient that the 
Journal has been deprived of its right to exclusive use of the information, for exclusivity is an 
important aspect of confidential business information and most private property for that matter.” 
See id. 
148 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 419, 429-39 (2011) (tracking the trajectory of the misappropriation theory as 
applied to “hot news” from its inception in 1918 in International News to the present and critiquing 
the expansion of the theory). 
149 Compare Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22 (protecting the “point of view” of stocks reviewed in 
the column), with Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (protecting news as 
“quasi property” involving two competing news services, “irrespective of the rights of either as 
against the public”), and Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing a property right in “time sensitive information” developed by “profit seeking 
entrepreneurs”). 
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Carpenter Court did not protect the news component of the “Heard” column, 
but rather the opinion component—including the information regarding 
which stocks were to be analyzed, the dates of this analysis, and the column-
ists’ recommendations on whether to invest. 150  The International News 
Court, by contrast, sought to protect the actual news component. As Justice 
Pitney observed in International News, “In considering the general question 
of property in news matter, it is necessary to recognize its dual character, 
distinguishing between the substance of the information and the particular 
form or collocation of words in which the writer has communicated it.”151 
Lastly, if the Journal sold the “Heard” column to another newspaper, a 
court would continue to protect the confidentiality of the column, as the 
identity of the column’s owner would not affect the nature of the rights 
associated with it.152 The confidential information protected in Carpenter 
thus scores a perfect three on the descriptive plane. 
b. The Confidential Information in Carpenter on the Normative Plane  
According to the Supreme Court, confidential business information 
carries, at minimum, the right to make use and the right to exclude.153 
Therefore, confidential business information can be understood under both 
the right-to-exclude and the bundle-of-rights conceptualizations.154 Winans 
also injured the Journal’s autonomy interest by taking away the Journal’s 
confidentiality.155 Under the autonomy theory, courts should recognize a 
property right in confidential business information to protect it from any 
interference by the public. Lastly, under the economic interest conceptual-
ization, protecting the right of the Journal to the confidentiality of the 
 
150 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23 (reasoning that the opinion component allowed the conspirators 
“to buy or sell based on the probable impact of the column on the market”). 
151 Int’l News, 248 U.S. at 234. 
152 The fact that the property right transfers with the thing illustrates that the right is 
attached to the thing, and not to the former owner of the thing—here the Journal. Cf. Radin, supra 
note 39, at 1851 (“[P]roperty rights themselves are presumed fully alienable . . . .”). 
153 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26 (describing the Journal’s “right in keeping confidential and 
making exclusive use”). 
154 See supra Sections I.A–B. 
155 A potential issue under this analysis is whether Kant, Hegel, or even Radin would find 
that corporations are entitled to the same rights as moral persons. Most likely, these scholars 
would conclude that corporations are not. See James E. Fleming, The Lawyer As Citizen, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1705 (2002) (“The translator of Kant’s The Metaphysical Elements of 
Justice, John Ladd, has argued with characteristic vigor that ‘[s]ince . . . formal organizations are 
not moral persons, and have no moral responsibilities, they have no moral rights. In particular, 
they have no moral right to freedom or autonomy.’” (quoting John Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of 
Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54 MONIST 488, 508 (1970))). Without moral freedom, there 
cannot be a right to property. See supra Section I.C. 
  
2013] The Property Matrix 1149 
 
material in the “Heard” column would promote stable ownership.156 In sum, 
the confidential business information protected by the Supreme Court in 
Carpenter scores a perfect seven under the matrix analysis, and should be 
considered a strong property. 
B. Marital Property—The Professional Degree 
1. Are Professional Degrees Property? 
The question of whether an advanced degree or a professional license is 
property—such that a spouse who supported the degree holder during the 
attainment of the degree ought to be entitled to its proceeds in a divorce—
has baffled courts and scholars alike.157 
Imagine the following hypothetical. Spouse A supports (or partially 
supports) spouse B while B pursues a law degree. Later, in a divorce settle-
ment, A seeks equitable distribution of the value of B’s degree. State courts 
have reached three different conclusions regarding such a situation. Some 
courts award the value of the degree upon distribution of marital property. 
A second group of courts holds that even though an advanced degree is not  
  
 
156 See supra Section I.D. 
157 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978) (interpreting Colorado’s 
version of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act and concluding that an educational degree 
“has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that term” but rather represents “an 
intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property”); In re 
Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 680 (Colo. 1987) (affirming that an advanced degree does not 
constitute marital property but concluding that the “contribution of one spouse to the education of 
the other spouse may be taken into consideration when marital property is divided”); Mahoney v. 
Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 532-33 (N.J. 1982) (holding that a business degree is not property under 
New Jersey’s marital statute); O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 717 (N.Y. 1985) (determining 
that “it would be unfair not to consider [a medical] license a marital asset”); Susan Etta Keller, The 
Rhetoric of Marriage, Achievement, and Power: An Analysis of Judicial Opinions Considering the 
Treatment of Professional Degrees as Marital Property, 21 VT. L. REV. 409, 423-35 (1996) (surveying 
the major cases regarding the imposition of spousal proprietary interests in professional degrees); 
Susan Klebanoff, Comment, To Love and Obey ‘Til Graduation Day—The Professional Degree in Light 
of the Uniform Marital Property Act, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 839, 846 (1985) (“The determination of 
whether a professional degree or the enhanced earning capacity that it represents constitutes 
divisible marital property has caused considerable confusion in spousal degree cases.”). But see Bell 
& Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 612 (suggesting that “courts that have attempted to determine 
whether degrees are subject to distribution by examining whether they are ‘property’ have 
approached the question from the wrong perspective” and arguing that a degree may be “a source 
of wealth that is appropriate for equitable or equal distribution”). 
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property, equity mandates compensation of the supporting spouse. Still 
other courts determine that the supporting spouse is not entitled to the 
value of the degree.158 Only a minority of courts has held that an advanced 
degree is marital property.159  
2. Professional Degrees Under the Property Matrix 
Table 5: Professional Degree Matrix Analysis 
Descriptive 
Rights of a person over a 
given thing 
In rem Attach to the thing 
0 0 0 
 
Normative 
Right to Exclude Bundle of Rights 
Autonomous 
Interests 
Economic 
Interests 
0 0 1 1 
a. Professional Degrees on the Descriptive Plane 
A degree as a degree does not convey any of the rights that we typically 
associate with property. Recall Honoré’s enumeration of property rights as  
the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the 
income of the thing, the right to the capital, the right to security, the rights 
or incidents of transmissibility and absence of term, the prohibition of 
harmful use, liability to execution, and the incident of residuarity.160 
Some could argue that a degree conveys, at least, the rights to use, manage, 
and gain income from the degree as a symbol of intellectual capital. It is not, 
however, the degree itself that conveys these rights but rather community 
consensus on the meaning of the degree. Additionally, the rights associated 
with a degree are not rights in rem. For example, an attorney who has 
passed the California Bar is not entitled to practice law in New York, 
regardless of the impressiveness of the degree-granting institution or her 
 
158 See William M. Howard, Spouse’s Professional Degree or License as Marital Property for 
Purposes of Alimony, Support, or Property Settlement, 3 A.L.R. 6th 447 (2005) (summarizing the three 
approaches that courts adopt when determining spousal entitlement to an advanced degree). 
159 See id. at 466-67 (enumerating the eight states that recognize an advanced degree as marital 
property).  
160 See Honoré, supra note 30, at 113. 
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bar exam score.161 The rights associated with the degree do not attach to the 
document but rather to the degree holder.162 In other words, C does not 
acquire B’s right to practice law in New York by buying B’s degree. As Yun-
chien Chang and Henry E. Smith would say, these rights do not “run” with 
the asset.163 Thus, the advanced degree fails to satisfy the three “essential” 
points of the descriptive plane.164 
b. Professional Degrees on the Normative Plane 
Given that the professional degree scored a zero on the descriptive plane, 
and given that these three points of analysis are essential components of 
property,165 there is no need to continue the analysis into the normative 
dimension.166 For sake of argument, however, I will recount the normative 
analysis. There is no right to exclude, or any other right, associated with an 
advanced degree.167 However, the misappropriation of B’s degree by C could 
arguably injure B’s autonomous and economic interests. Thus, an advanced 
degree would receive a two on the normative plane.168 
C. Client Lists—Amortization and Trade Secrets 
The final case study of intangible property rights begins with an examina-
tion of how the Internal Revenue Service and tax courts resolve whether an 
intangible asset should be amortized under the Internal Revenue Code. 
“Historically, when a taxpayer purchased a business, the portion of the 
purchase price allocated to goodwill was not depreciable.”169 To maximize 
 
161 See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN NEW YORK STATE 19 (2010), 
available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Publications/ThePracticeofLawinNewYork 
Statemembersonly/Practice_of_Law_2012-2013.pdf (“[Y]ou must gain admission to the New York 
State Bar in order to practice law.” (emphasis added)). 
162 For example, one who earns a law degree must “possess good moral character and fitness 
and successfully complete a written exam” in order to practice law in New York. Id. Such 
requirements focus on the individual. 
163 See Chang & Smith, supra note 64, at 26. 
164 See supra Section I.E. 
165 See Chang & Smith, supra note 64, at 24 (noting “in rem status, the right to exclude, and 
running with assets” as characteristic features of property). 
166 See supra Section I.E. 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 161-63. 
168 To clarify, I am not implying that courts should not distribute the earnings from an ad-
vanced degree among spouses. Rather, I claim that courts would err in reasoning that the entitlement 
of A to B’s future earnings flows from a proprietary interest in the advanced degree. In other words, 
courts could instead rely on equity and fairness principles to distribute these assets. 
169 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 341 (6th ed. 2009). 
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the amount of money that they could depreciate, taxpayers argued that 
“they had purchased other intangible assets with a determinable useful life 
that could be depreciated.”170 One of the seminal cases in this area of law171 
is Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, in which the Supreme Court 
ruled that a newspaper’s list of subscribers was not goodwill, but rather an 
amortizable intangible asset.172 Although Newark Morning Ledger has been 
superseded by § 197 of the Internal Revenue Code173—which allows for the 
amortization of most intangible assets, including goodwill, over a fifteen-
year period174—the Court’s decision to count the list of subscribers as an 
intangible asset instead of goodwill illustrates, as in the mail and wire fraud 
cases, how loosely courts interpret statutory definitions of property. 
1. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States 
In 1976, The Herald Company (Herald) bought a majority of shares in 
Booth Newspapers, Inc. (Booth).175 Herald’s adjusted basis in Booth was 
$328 million; Herald allocated $234 million of this to “financial assets (cash, 
securities, accounts and notes receivable, the shares of its wholly owned 
subsidiary that published Parade Magazine, etc.) and tangible assets (land, 
buildings, inventories, production equipment, computer hardware, etc.).”176 
Herald then allocated the remaining $94 million to “an intangible asset 
denominated ‘paid subscribers’” ($67.8 million) and into going-concern 
value and goodwill ($26.2 million).177 The asset “paid subscribers” was a list 
of the 460,000 subscribers to the eight newspapers that Booth used to 
manage, and “the $67.8 million figure was petitioner’s estimate of future 
profits to be derived from these at-will subscribers.”178  
In 1987, the Newark Morning Ledger Co. (the Ledger), a newspaper 
publisher, merged with Herald, and became its successor.179 “[The] Ledger 
 
170 Id. 
171 See Catherine L. Hammond, The Amortization of Intangible Assets: § 197 of the Internal Revenue 
Code Settles the Confusion, 27 CONN. L. REV. 915, 925 (1995) (describing Newark Morning Ledger as 
a “landmark decision”). The question, “Is this property?” also arises in partnership taxation, 
specifically in I.R.C. § 712 cases. See, e.g., United States v. Stafford, 727 F.2d 1043 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(discussing whether a partnership interest is taxable property). 
172 507 U.S. 546, 570 (1993). 
173 See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 169, at 342 (“There is no longer any incentive to try 
to distinguish goodwill from other assets since both are now amortizable.”). 
174 I.R.C. § 197(a), (d) (2006). 
175 Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 549. 
176 Id. at 549-50. 
177 Id. at 550. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 549. 
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then filed for a refund with the IRS alleging that Herald should have been 
allowed a deduction for the amortization of the 460,000 paid subscribers,” 
and subsequently sued for a tax refund in federal district court.180 At trial, 
the Ledger argued that the list of subscribers was not goodwill (and was 
therefore amortizable) because its value was ascertainable, and the list had a 
limited useful life.181 The government argued instead that the list of subscrib-
ers was indistinguishable from goodwill, and therefore nondeductible.182 The 
district court ruled in favor of the Ledger, finding that the customer list had 
a “limited useful life” and an ascertainable value.183 The Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the customer list was “the 
essence of goodwill.”184  
The Supreme Court began its analysis by referring to the statutory basis 
for the decision, which at the time was § 167 of the Internal Revenue 
Code.185 The Court wrote, “Section 167(a) of the Code allows as a deduction 
for depreciation a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion and wear and 
tear, including obsolescence, of property used in a trade or business or of 
property held for the production of income.”186 The Court then clarified that 
“[s]ince 1927, the IRS consistently has taken the position that ‘goodwill’ is 
nondepreciable.” 187  As recounted by the Court, the Internal Revenue 
Service reasoned that goodwill was nondepreciable because it was not 
susceptible to wear and tear.188 Thus, the Court held that any “taxpayer able 
to prove that a particular asset can be valued and that it has a limited useful 
life may depreciate its value.”189 As such, the Ledger was allowed to depre-
ciate the value of the list of subscribers.190 
 
180 See Hammond, supra note 171, at 926. 
181 See Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 551 (stating that Ledger estimated the average 
subscriber would continue to subscribe to Booth newspapers for 14.7 to 23.4 years and that the 
value of the paid subscribers could reasonably be estimated at $67,773,000). 
182 Id. at 552. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Congress enacted § 197 after the Newark Morning Ledger decision. See Hammond, supra 
note 171, at 936-38 (describing Network Morning Ledger as the “final step toward permitting the 
amortization of intangible assets before the enactment of § 197”). 
186 Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added). 
187 Id. at 554. 
188 See id. at 554 n.8. 
189 Id. at 566. 
190 Id.  
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2. Client Lists Under the Property Matrix 
Table 6: Client List Matrix Analysis 
Descriptive 
Rights of a person over a 
given thing 
In rem Attach to the thing 
1 Unclear 1 
 
Normative 
Right to Exclude Bundle of Rights 
Autonomous 
Interests 
Economic 
Interests 
1 1 1 1 
a. The Client List on the Descriptive Plane 
Given the language of § 167, the Court implicitly categorized the client 
list as property by permitting the Ledger to depreciate the value of the list 
of subscribers.191 Courts in trade secret cases, however, are often unclear as to 
whether a client list ought to receive trade secret protection. The willingness 
of a court to protect the client list often depends on the feasibility of its 
duplication.192 This raises the question of whether courts’ willingness to 
grant trade secret protection to a client list indicates the court’s belief that 
client lists are property. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Supreme Court 
addressed whether a trade secret constitutes property.193 The Court reasoned 
that despite their intangible nature, trade secrets have several of the 
 
191 See supra text accompanying note 186. 
192 See Heartland Home Fin. v. Allied Home Mortg. Capital Corp., 258 F. App’x 860, 862 
(6th Cir. 2008) (refusing to protect “information that is openly available on the market at minimal 
cost”); Sys. Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Haarmann, 907 N.E.2d 63, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that 
the client list of a computer network service provider did not deserve trade secret protection 
because it was “general information and [wa]s common knowledge to people in the computer 
service trade or [wa]s otherwise readily available information”); Al Minor & Assoc. v. Martin, 881 
N.E.2d 850, 855 (Ohio 2008) (protecting an employer’s client list against a former employee’s 
misappropriation by memory); Ed Nowogroski Ins. v. Rucker, 971 P.2d 936 (Wash. 1999) (ignoring 
the “manner of taking a trade secret”—whether by memory or by written copy—to protect a client 
list). But see DeGiorgio v. Megabyte Int’l, Inc., 468 S.E.2d 367, 369 (Ga. 1996) (ordering the trial 
court to revise an interlocutory injunction that prevented a party from “utilizing personal 
knowledge of customer and vender information” because the Georgia Trade Secrets Act only 
covered tangible client lists); see also Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Lab, Inc., 437 S.E.2d 302, 305 (Ga. 1993) 
(interpreting the Georgia Trade Secrets Act to protect “tangible” client lists). 
193 See 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (“We therefore hold that to the extent that Monsanto 
has an interest in its health, safety, and environmental data cognizable as a trade-secret property 
right under Missouri law, that property right is protected by the Taking Clause [sic] of the Fifth 
Amendment.”). 
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characteristics of tangible property: a trade secret “is assignable,” “can 
form the res of a trust,” and “passes to a trustee in bankruptcy.”194 The 
Court further reasoned that the “general perception of trade secrets as 
property is consonant with” the labor theory of property.195 
Under the first characteristic of the descriptive plane, ownership of a 
client list does convey upon the owner a set of rights, including the right to 
exclude, the right to transfer, and the right to make use. There is some 
ambiguity, however, as the rights derived from ownership of the client list 
often depend on, or at least correlate to, the confidentiality of the list.196 In 
spite of this uncertainty, I give the customer list a one on the first point of 
the descriptive plane. 
The current case law makes it unclear whether the rights attached to a 
customer list are in rem or in personam. Defendants in this type of case are 
often either former employees, who owed fiduciary or contractual duties to 
their former employers,197 or competitors, to whom a principle of fair 
competition might apply, 198  or who have breached an agreement of 
confidentiality.199 Since it is unlikely that a plaintiff will file a claim against 
a party that is neither a competitor nor a former employee (unlike a property 
owner seeking to enjoin a trespass, for instance), we are unable to determine 
fully whether the rights associated with a client list are rights in rem or in 
 
194 Id. at 1002. 
195 Id. at 1002-03. John Locke first articulated the labor theory of property. See JOHN 
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 134 (Thomas I. Cook, ed., Hafner Press 1947) 
(1690) (“Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he 
hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property.”). 
196 See, e.g., N. Atl. Instruments, Inc. v. Haber, 188 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A customer 
list developed by a business through substantial effort and kept in confidence may be treated as a 
trade secret and protected at the owner’s instance against disclosure to a competitor, provided the 
information it contains is not otherwise readily ascertainable.” (quoting Defiance Button Mach. 
Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1063 (2d Cir. 1985))); Delta Med. Sys. v. Mid-Am. 
Med. Sys., 772 N.E.2d 768, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“[B]ecause a list of [plaintiffs’] customers can 
be duplicated with little effort, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to find that 
[plaintiff] presented a fair question that its customer ‘list’ . . . was a protectable trade secret.”); 
see also Haber, 188 F.3d at 46 (listing a series of state and federal cases protecting hard-to-duplicate 
customer lists under New York law). 
197 See, e.g., Martin, 881 N.E.2d at 855 (recognizing a client list that was used by a former 
employee as an employer’s trade secret despite the absence of a signed noncompete agreement). 
198 See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (“The question [as 
to what is unfair competition] is not so much the rights of either party as against the public but 
their rights as between themselves.”). 
199 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam) (affirming a grant of a preliminary injunction to a plaintiff seeking to prevent a former 
employee from disclosing information on the plaintiff ’s insecticide products in violation of a 
signed noncompete agreement). 
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personam. As such, I withhold judgment in the second category of the 
descriptive plane. 
Lastly, the rights associated with a client list are attached to the list 
itself and are not vested in the corporation that originally created the 
list.200 Therefore, the customer list scores a one in the third category of the 
descriptive plane. 
b. The Client List on the Normative Plane 
Even when courts refuse to grant trade secret protection to customer 
lists, they do not question the victims’ right to self-protection.201 In other 
words, a victim has, at least, a privilege-right to self-protection.202 Inter-
estingly, the Supreme Court in Monsanto emphasized that, with regard to 
trade secrets, “the extent of the property right therein is defined by the 
extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure 
to others.”203 Accordingly, the right-to-exclude norm explains why courts 
protect client lists. Similarly, this protection can be understood as within 
the bundle of rights, as ownership of the customer list conveys not only the 
right to exclude, but also the right to use and the right to alienate.204  
The rights conveyed by the ownership of a client list are consistent with 
the autonomous-interest conceptualization of property. A third party who 
misappropriates a client list injures the list’s owner. If that third party were 
to duplicate the list (without resorting to unfair competition), or if the 
owner were to relinquish the list, then (in Kantian terms) it would signal 
that the owner either did not have full control of the object (it was easily 
duplicated), or did not effectively exert her will on the object (and therefore 
voluntarily relinquished it).205 Courts’ examination of the reproducibility, 
and the measures taken to protect the confidentiality, of the customer list is 
consistent with the autonomy interest conceptualization. Because a client 
 
200 For instance, in Newark Morning Ledger, the issue was whether the Ledger could depreciate 
the list of subscribers it obtained when it merged with Herald, which in turn had obtained it from 
Booth. See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 570 (1993). 
201 Courts emphasize the efforts taken by the client-list owner to protect the confidentiality 
of the list in determining whether the list owner is entitled to further protection. See, e.g., Liebert 
Corp. v. Mazur, 827 N.E.2d 909, 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“[Plaintiffs] must show they took 
affirmative measures to prevent others from acquiring or using the information.”). 
202 See Balganesh, Demystifying, supra note 1, at 613-14 (describing the privilege-right to 
exclude). 
203 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984). 
204 See supra subsection II.C.2.a.  
205 See supra Part I.C. 
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list has “independent economic value,”206 and protecting a trade secret 
promotes efficiency,207 bestowing property rights upon the customer list is 
also consistent with the economic interest conceptualization. In conclusion, 
the client list scores a six under the property matrix. This case also reveals a 
potential problem with this kind of categorization: sometimes more infor-
mation may be necessary to make a judgment. Thus a client list should be 
considered a medium-strength property. 
D. Organs for Transplant 
Courts have traditionally refused to recognize body parts as property,208 
mainly because courts view the sale of organs and limbs as unconscionable.209 
However, courts have recognized quasi-property interests “that members of 
a deceased’s family ha[ve] over the deceased’s mortal remains for purposes 
of disposal.”210 The scope of this interest is very limited: the only rightful 
holders are relatives, it gives rise only to a remedial right (the right of 
sepulcher), and it applies only against converters.211 Advances in technology, 
 
206 Robert W. Hillman, The Property Wars of Law Firms: Of Client Lists, Trade Secrets and the 
Fiduciary Duties of Law Partners, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 773-75 (2003) (identifying the way in 
which law firm “client lists may seem to possess the requisite ‘independent economic value’ to 
justify protection as trade secrets” but questioning the applicability of trade secrets doctrine to law 
firm client lists because of the unique ethical obligations of such firms). 
207 See Jonathan R. Chally, Note, The Law of Trade Secrets: Toward a More Efficient Approach, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 1269, 1296 (2004) (“[T]rade secrets promote[] efficiency because [they] insure[] 
that neither the original innovator nor the competitor seeking to obtain the trade secret undertake 
wasteful activities.” (citation omitted)). 
208 See Erin Colleran, Comment, My Body, His Property?: Prescribing a Framework to Determine 
Ownership Interests in Directly Donated Human Organs, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2007) 
(attributing the reticence of courts to recognize organs as property as reflecting a wider societal 
fear regarding the sanctity of bodily autonomy). 
209 Past scholarship has explored the reluctance of social institutions (including courts) to treat 
body parts as property. In this literature, the unconscionability of thinking of an arm or an eye as 
property figures as one of the primary reasons for this phenomenon. See, e.g., Charles C. Dunham 
IV, Comment, “Body Property”: Challenging the Ethical Barriers in Organ Transplantation to Protect 
Individual Autonomy, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39, 41 (2008) (“The notion of the body as property 
(or the commodification of the body) raises ethical concerns and challenges the moral integrity 
and dignity of the body.”). This ethical problem disappears when we ignore the act of severing an 
organ or limb from the holder, and instead think of a body part as a harvested item. While a 
thorough exploration of the bioethical concerns associated with the application of property 
principles to the human body is beyond the scope of this Comment, the scholarship on the 
historical trajectory of, and current debates in, this controversial field is well developed. For an 
overview of the issues associated with harvested organs, see generally Laura J. Hilmert, Note, 
Cloning Human Organs: Potential Sources and Property Implications, 77 IND. L.J. 363 (2002).  
210 Balganesh, Quasi-Property, supra note 25, at 1897. 
211 See id. Balganesh refers to the quasi-property interest as a “fiction” that nonetheless  
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particularly transplant technology, have now further problematized the 
question of whether body parts constitute property. 
1. Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc. 
Shortly after Peter Lucia died, his family decided to donate his kidneys 
to his friend Robert Colavito, whose own kidneys were failing.212 The family 
informed an officer from the New York Organ Donor Network (NYODN) 
that they were only willing to remove and donate Lucia’s kidneys if the 
kidneys were given to Colavito.213 Both of Lucia’s kidneys were removed 
postmortem, and one was sent to a hospital in Miami, Florida, near where 
Colavito lived.214 The day of the transplant, the physician realized that the 
kidney was damaged, so his office called NYODN to request the second 
Lucia kidney.215 NYODN replied that the second kidney had already been 
donated to another patient.216 The doctors subsequently discovered, after 
Colavito had been sent home, that neither of Lucia’s kidneys were compatible 
with Colavito’s antibodies. 217  Among other claims, Colavito brought a 
conversion claim against NYODN.218 The district court dismissed the claim, 
relying on right of sepulcher case law; the court reasoned that it was 
“against public policy to recognize broad property rights in the body of a 
deceased.”219  
On appeal, the Second Circuit distinguished the right of sepulcher cases 
by signaling that in the former, the claim was not one of conversion but 
rather one of intentional infliction of emotional distress.220 The court 
further reasoned that in organ donation cases, “[p]laintiffs such as Colavito 
 
had real functional significance, since it enabled relatives to recover damages upon 
commercial and noncommercial interferences, and located the middle-level prin-
ciple motivating this right in the idea of possessing the corpse. In keeping with 
the limited purpose that the interest served, the law came to forbid the conveyance 
of this quasi-property interest and recognized it to be of no independent pecuniary 
significance. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
212 Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2006).  
213 Id. at 218. 
214 Id. 
215 Id.  
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 219. Despite this discovery, Colavito remained unaware of the incompatibility of the 
kidneys for approximately one month. Id. 
218 Id. at 220. 
219 Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), 
aff ’d in part and question certified to state supreme court 438 F.3d 214. 
220 Colavito, 438 F.3d at 223-24. 
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are not using the term ‘property’ as a legal fiction upon which to base a 
claim for emotional harm. They have—or assert that they have—a practical 
use for the organ, not a sentimental one.”221 The court concluded that “it is 
arguable that under the New York Public Health Law, a person or entity 
may have an enforceable property right in a functioning organ.”222 Ulti-
mately, the Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of 
Appeals for resolution of the state law question.223 
In answering the certified questions, the Court of Appeals of New York 
ruled that Colavito did not have a conversion cause of action, not because a 
kidney could not be property,224 but because Colavito, “as a specified donee 
of an incompatible kidney,” could not “possess the kidney in question.”225 
2. Organs for Transplant Under the Property Matrix 
Table 7: Organ Transplant Matrix Analysis 
Descriptive 
Rights of a person over a 
given thing 
In rem Attach to the thing 
1 1 1 
 
Normative 
Right to Exclude Bundle of Rights 
Autonomous 
Interests 
Economic 
Interests 
0 1 0 1 
a. Organs for Transplant on the Descriptive Plane 
As illustrated by the trajectory of the Colavito litigation, an organ trans-
plant can give rise to rights over the organ. Most important for our analysis 
is the fact that the Court of Appeals of New York recognizes these rights 
only if the donee is able to assert dominion over the organ—in other words, 
if the organ is compatible with the donee.226 This caveat leaves the organ in 
a legal-relationship limbo between the time when the donor passes away and 
 
221 Id. at 225. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 232-33. 
224 The court refrained from deciding whether and under what conditions a person “may 
conceivably have acquired rights in the body or organ of a deceased person.” See Colavito v. N.Y. 
Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E.2d 713, 719 (N.Y. 2006). 
225 Id.  
226 Id. at 722. 
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the time before the donee is declared to be a match with the organ.227 
During this period, neither the relatives of the organ donor nor the donee 
can claim to have a use right over the organ. Nevertheless, because the 
organ does give rise to a right of possession (among other rights), this case 
satisfies the first point on the matrix. If the courts were to recognize a 
property right, this right would be against any other person in the world 
(not only the would-be converter in right-of-sepulcher cases).228 An inter-
esting question arises when the decedent’s family decides not to donate the 
organ(s). Whose right takes precedence—that of the donee who was 
originally slated to receive the organ or of the family? Arguably, at least 
under New York law, the property right of the donee should trump the 
family’s quasi-property right.229 Finally, the right attaches to the organ itself. 
Therefore, organ transplants score a three on the descriptive plane. 
b. Organs for Transplant on the Normative Plane 
Were a court to recognize property rights in the organ, it would probably 
recognize the right to exclude others from the organ. But what would this 
recognition entail in practice? A conversion right is in essence a remedial 
right guarding one’s right to exclude. The court would return to Mary an 
object stolen by George, thus affirming Mary’s right to exclude others from 
her property. Even so, this instance cannot be understood exclusively under 
such a theory; as indicated by the reasoning of the Court of Appeals of New 
York in Colavito,230 it is the right to possess, and not the right to exclude, 
from which property rights in an organ emanate. Thus, I grant a zero in the 
first category. For similar reasons, however, I grant a one under the bundle-
of-rights framework. 
The application of the autonomous-interest conceptualization is more 
challenging. One’s body parts and organs are too “valuable” and the person-
hood “invested” in them too strong for the body part and the “original 
owner” to be severed figuratively even if physically separated.231 It is unclear 
what would happen were the donor still alive or the organ cloned. The 
academic literature on this issue remains unresolved. Some scholars have 
 
227 The timing issue is further exacerbated by the fact that it is often difficult to define 
“death” in an ethically satisfying manner. For a depiction of current debates in defining death for 
the purpose of harvesting organs, see Rob Stein, A Struggle to Define ‘Death’ for Organ Donors, 
SHOTS: NPR HEALTH BLOG (Mar. 28, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/ 
03/27/149463045/a-struggle-to-define-death-for-organ-donors. 
228 See supra subsection II.D.1. 
229 See supra text accompanying notes 220-22. 
230 Id. 
231 See supra Section I.C. 
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argued that even Kant would recognize property rights in organs in today’s 
world.232 But scholars who emphasize autonomy interests have refrained from 
recognizing a property interest in organs.233 Therefore, I grant a zero under 
the autonomy interest. Conversely however, economic-interest scholars 
would more likely than not recognize a property interest in organs, even in 
a world in which the purchase and sale of the organs were forbidden.234 
Allowing donors (or their families) to identify particular donees and limit 
the transferability of a given organ would probably be welfare-enhancing 
even if it were not monetarily enhancing, as it would encourage more 
people to donate. Recall, for example, that the Lucia family was only willing 
to donate the kidney to their friend. Saying that property rights could be 
recognized in organs (or other genetic material), however, is not tantamount 
to approving of their commodification.235  
In conclusion, organ transplants receive a five under the property matrix, 
and thus should be considered property, though of relatively weak strength. 
However, the matrix does not differentiate between the deceased donor (who 
really has no further interest in the organ236) and the living donor. In either 
context, the matrix would likely define the harvested organ as property, 
even though society has proven split on the use of harvested biological 
 
232 See generally Stephen R. Munzer, Kant and Property Rights in Body Parts, 6 CANADIAN J.L. 
& JURISPRUDENCE 319, 322-41 (1993) (contrasting Kant’s explicit objection to the sale of body 
parts with broad Kantian theoretical approaches to property that suggest the existence of a 
property interest in a body part). 
233 See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 325 (2002) (“Radin is especially concerned about commodification 
of, and harm to, persons and personhood by the commodification of objects that are constitutive of 
personhood. She contends that there are strong arguments for considering such objects, which she 
labels ‘contested commodities,’ to be non-property, market-inalienable property, or property 
subject to carefully drawn regulations which limit commodification and protect personhood (i.e., 
partial market-inalienability).” (footnote omitted)). But see Kenyon Mason & Graeme Laurie, 
Consent or Property? Dealing with the Body and Its Parts in the Shadow of Bristol and Alder Hey, 64 
MOD. L. REV. 710, 727 (2001) (“Recognising property rights in our person also facilitates further 
and better respect for individual autonomy . . . .”). 
234 See, e.g., William Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize 
Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 719 (1995) (“A property right in 
the body should be recognized because it would serve as an important protection in a world where 
commercial interests in human body parts already exist.”); see also id. at 724 (“Recognizing a 
property right does not mean that the law cannot regulate the subject of that right. For example, 
an object may be property, and yet there may be a regulation on the disposition and sale of that 
property.”). 
235 Still, some scholars have obfuscated the issue. See, e.g., Donald Joralemon, Organ Wars: 
The Battle for Body Parts, 9 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 335, 344-47 (labeling as “sellers” those 
scholars who advocate a property rights recognition in body parts). 
236 Excluding, of course, any spiritual beliefs that may dictate otherwise. 
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material from living donors and uncomfortable with the application of 
property principles to such material.237  
As holders of weak-to-medium-strength property, the Lucia family 
should be entitled to (probably) both claim- and privilege-rights. Given the 
social importance of body parts, however, society would probably want to 
grant the highest level of protection to them: remedial rights. The matrix 
does not itself take into account social opprobrium. Courts, however, are 
free to consider the public interest and other such values when determining 
the applicability of property principles to organs from living donors. Even 
if courts conclude that organs are property, the property right may still be 
limited by other normative values—in this case, ethical and moral concerns.238  
CONCLUSION  
The Supreme Court declared in Monsanto that “[p]roperty inter-
ests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and 
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law.”239 The continuing inability of 
scholars and courts to articulate a clear and consistent definition of property, 
combined with property’s centrality to statutory and common law, makes it 
a powerful device that can be easily devalued by its incorrect usage. In 
Penner’s words, “Deciding that one has property in one’s body parts, or that 
a news service has property in reports of the events of the day, raises 
profound questions about the role the category of property plays in our 
moral and legal discourse.”240 
The property matrix I describe would help courts address whether a 
thing is property, as well as concomitant questions about which rights and 
obligations follow as a result of this determination.241 Though theorists have 
long debated the content of property, rapid advances in technology ensure 
that courts will face these questions more frequently in the future. Current 
 
237 See supra note 209. 
238 Cf. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human values. 
They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.”). 
239 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (citing Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 577 (1972)). 
240 Penner, supra note 7, at 721. 
241 See Balganesh, Demystifying, supra note 1, at 602 (“Characterizing something as a right—
absolute or conditional—brings with it certain well-defined legal consequences. Therefore, 
understanding the basis of such a characterization helps to shed light on the kind of consequences 
that do and ought to follow.”). 
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debates may center on whether bone marrow,242 sperm,243 or email servers244 
constitute property. One can imagine future questions of whether one’s 
brain waves, DNA, and fertilized ova245 are our property as well.246 Prece-
dent simply does not establish clear guidelines to approach these issues. 
Our difficulty defining property does not lead to the conclusion that it is 
a hollow concept or that courts may freely employ property to justify their 
policy choices. The matrix I propose in this Comment would provide courts 
with a structure for appraising both the existence and degree of property in 
any given thing. For example, confidential business information receives a 
seven under the matrix; thus, it is a strong property. As a result, the Carpenter 
Court was correct in using the full machinery of the state to protect the 
Journal’s property. By comparison, customer lists, which receive a six, should 
receive a lower level of protection. Thus, it is consistent that the level of 
judicial protection owed a client list depends on how much its creator 
protected it—i.e., the list gives rise to a privilege-right. Objects that are not 
considered property (like advanced degrees) do not give rise to either of 
these rights (at least not from a propertarian framework).  
Absent a framework for assessing property interests, inconsistencies in 
court decisions risk devaluing property as a concept. Clarifying our sense of 
property at this juncture is the appropriate way to prevent this devaluation. 
A first step toward tackling the devaluation of property would be the 
recognition by courts and scholars that property is difficult (and perhaps 
impossible) to define in simple, all-inclusive terms. One possible solution to 
this conundrum is to expand our terminology. The different scores for the 
case studies in this Comment suggest that there may be varying qualities of 
property rights: weak, medium, and strong. And courts should grant 
 
242 See Barry Lyons, ‘The Good That Is Interred in Their Bones’: Are There Property Rights in the 
Child?, 19 MED. L. REV. 372, 393-96 (2011) (exploring the applicability of property principles to 
bone marrow). 
243 See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Newest Property: Reproductive Technologies and the Concept of 
Parenthood, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 84-87 (1998) (“[C]ourts have generally faced the issue 
of whether sperm is property under more difficult circumstances—after the death of the donor—
without reaching conclusive results.”). 
244 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 308 (Cal. 2003) (refusing “to create a fiction of injury 
to the communication system”). 
245 See generally Deborah Kay Walther, “Ownership” of the Fertilized Ovum in Vitro, 26 FAM. 
L.Q. 235 (1992). 
246 See, e.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing 
“[s]perm which is stored by its provider with the intent that it be used for artificial insemination” 
as property under California’s Probate Code); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) 
(“[P]reembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim 
category . . . .”). See generally Jonathan F. Will, Comment, DNA as Property: Implications on the 
Constitutionality of DNA Dragnets, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 129, 139-41 (2003). 
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different rights in accordance with the quality of the property interest at 
stake. In other words, weak, medium, and strong quality property interests 
give rise to different sets of privilege-, claim-, or remedial rights. The 
strongest forms of property ought to be protected by all three such rights, 
while weak property should only be protected by claim-rights.247  It is 
through this dual system of appraisal—an analysis embedded in the property 
matrix—that courts and scholars may at once decide what is property and to 
what degree. Thus, the matrix preserves the utility of “property” in the 
process. 
 
 
247 See supra text accompanying notes 60-63. 
